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IntroductIon
On May 12, 2010, Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Joseph 
Lieberman (I-CT) released details of their proposed American 
Power Act, a comprehensive energy and climate change bill 
developed over the preceding nine months by the two sena-
tors, chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Homeland 
Security Committees respectively, along with Senator Lind-
sey  Graham  (R-SC).1  With  US  unemployment  just  below 
10 percent and the sunken Deepwater Horizon drilling rig’s 
ruptured well pouring thousands of barrels of oil into the Gulf 
of Mexico each day, the senators promised that if passed the 
bill will: (1) reduce US oil consumption and dependence on 
oil imports; (2) cut US carbon pollution 17 percent below 
2005 levels by 2020 and over 80 percent by 2050; and (3) 
create  jobs  and  restore  US  global  economic  leadership.  In 
this policy brief we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
American Power Act in achieving those goals. Our key find-
ings include (summarized in Appendix 1):
  Energy Sector Changes: Through an economywide carbon 
price and individual technology incentives, the American 
Power Act would significantly alter the way the United 
States produces and consumes energy. The share of total 
energy demand met by fossil fuel sources of supply would 
fall from 84 percent today to 70 percent in 2030. Renew-
able and nuclear energy would grow from 8 percent of US 
energy supply today to 16 and 14 percent respectively in 
1. Details of the American Power Act are available online at http://kerry.
senate.gov/americanpoweract/intro.cfm. Senator Graham did not ultimately 
participate in the release of the draft legislation.
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2030. Over the next two decades, 106 gigawatts of renew-
able power, 78 gigawatts of nuclear power, and 72 giga-
watts of carbon capture and sequestration would be built, 
replacing or retrofitting an aging fleet of coal-fired power 
plants. The legislation would also improve energy efficiency 
in homes, businesses, and vehicles, reducing overall energy 
demand by 5 percent relative to business as usual in 2030. 
  Energy Security Implications: The American Power Act 
would reduce US oil imports by 33 to 40 percent below 
current levels and 9 to 19 percent below business as usual 
by 2030. This will cut US spending on imported oil by 
$51 billion to $93 billion per year and by lowering global 
oil prices, reduce oil producer revenues by $263 billion to 
$436 billion annually by 2030. 
  Environmental Impact: The American Power Act would 
establish an economy-wide carbon price starting at $16.47 
per ton in 2013 and growing to $55.44 dollars per ton 
in 2030, though different sectors of the economy would 
face this price at different start dates and through different 
mechanisms. The combined effect would be a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions from covered sources (85 percent 
of all emissions) of 22 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 
and 42 percent by 2030 including international offsets. 
Economy-wide emissions (including offsets) are 17 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2020 and 31 percent by 2030.2 
  Employment Effects: The American Power Act prompts 
$41.1 billion in annual electricity sector investment between 
2011 and 2030, $22.5 billion more than under business 
as usual. Given that the United States is currently below 
full employment with most economists projecting a slow 
labor market recovery, this investment is more stimulative 
than inflationary in the first decade, resulting in an average 
annual increase in US employment of 203,000 jobs above 
business as usual, with the net of the jobs lost in fossil fuel 
production and as a result of higher energy prices between 
2001 and 2020. In the second decade of the program, high-
er energy and product prices offset the employment gains 
from new investment. The potential employment benefits 
of increased US competitiveness in clean energy exports, 
unlocking  profitable  investment  opportunities  in  energy 
efficiency, and spillover from clean energy innovation into 
other sectors are not quantified in this analysis.
  Impact on Consumers: By pricing carbon, the American 
Power Act raises the price of fossil fuels and electricity 
2. The American Power Act includes some complimentary measures to reduce 
emissions from non-covered sources, such as a separate program for hydrofluo-
rocarbons (HFC) gases. We do not include these in our analysis. 
generated with fossil fuels for businesses and consumers. 
Households see a 2 to 5 percent increase in energy prices 
between 2011 and 2020, depending on fuel type, and a 
3 to 7 percent increase between 2021 and 2030. Energy 
efficiency improvements offset some or all of these energy 
price increases. In our analysis, households see somewhere 
between a $136 increase and a $35 dollar decrease in annu-
al energy expenditures, depending on future improvements 
in vehicle efficiency. The American Power Act also returns 
much of the revenue raised through the sale of pollution 
permits to households, with further mitigates the impact 
of higher energy prices. 
  The nation-wide assessment in this policy brief is descrip-
tive  only.  Forthcoming  analysis  will  evaluate  state  and 
regional impacts and identify areas in which the legislation 
could be changed to better achieve energy security, envi-
ronmental, employment, and economic goals. 
Scope and Methodology
We  analyzed  the  American  Power  Act  using  the  US  Energy 
Information  Administration  (EIA)’s  National  Energy  Model-
ing System (NEMS).3 NEMS is what EIA uses for their Annual 
Energy Outlook (AEO), as well as to model energy and climate 
change legislation when asked to do so by the US Congress. 
We used the AEO 2009 reference case as the business-as-usual 
scenario,4 and assessed the impacts of the American Power Act 
through  2030  (the  AEO  2009  modeling  window).  The  day 
before the American Power Act was released, EIA published the 
final AEO 2010 (EIA 2010a). We were unable to switch over 
to the new baseline in time for this report, but incorporated 
the updated technology cost estimates from the AEO 2010 in 
our analysis.5 Evaluating the employment effects of energy and 
climate change legislation has not, in the past, been a primary 
focus of NEMS. Given that job creation is one of the principle 
objectives Senators Kerry and Lieberman seek to achieve with 
their proposal, we enhanced the model to provide a more accu-
rate picture of the bill’s potential employment impacts. Our 
methodology is discussed in the section on employment below. 
3. Documentation on the NEMS model is available online at http://www.eia.
doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview/.
4. The Annual Energy Report 2009 includes the provisions of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act and is available online at http://www.eia.doe.
gov/oiaf/archive/aeo09/index.html (EIA 2009).
5. Specifically, we used AEO 2010’s capital costs for power generation technol-
ogy, which included a 13 percent increase in the cost of nuclear power plants 
and a 5 to 6 percent increase in the cost of carbon capture and sequestration 
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Using this framework, we modeled the major provisions 
in titles I–IV of the legislation: 
  Title I—Domestic Clean Energy Development: Provides 
incentives for the deployment of nuclear power, carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS), renewable energy, clean 
vehicles,  and  energy  efficiency.  This  title  also  includes 
offshore drilling provisions, but in our analysis these provi-
sions would not materially alter the levels of development 
projected  by  EIA  under  business  as  usual  and  are  not 
included in the model.
  Title II—Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction: Estab-
lishes  economywide  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  pollution 
reduction targets but sector-specific regulations. Beginning 
in 2013, the electric power sector must purchase pollution 
permits (called emission allowances) to cover their annual 
greenhouse  gas  emissions,  thus  creating  a  market  price 
for carbon. This obligation extends to natural gas and the 
industrial sector starting in 2016. The power and industrial 
sectors can use offset credits to cover up to two billion tons 
of  their  collective  compliance  obligation,  25  percent  of 
which can come from international sources.6 The transpor-
tation sector purchases allowances at a set price equal to the 
average market price for the power and industrial sectors   
pay for emission allowances at the end of each quarter. This 
title sets a $25 ceiling on allowance prices in 2013, which 
increases  by  5  percent  annually,  adjusted  for  inflation. 
There is also a price floor of $12 in 2013 that increases at 
a rate of 3 percent annually, adjusted for inflation.7 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) holds 3.6 percent 
of all allowances in a strategic reserve to be sold at the ceil-
ing price if it’s reached. 
  Title  III—Consumer  Protection:  Sixty-five  percent  of 
the value of the allowances created by title III is used to 
offset the impact of higher energy prices on US consum-
ers. In the first few years of the program, this is mostly 
through the provision of free allowances to electricity and 
natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs), who are 
instructed to use them for the benefit of rate payers. Later 
in the program, allowance revenue is returned directly to 
consumers as a rebate. In all years, 15 percent of allowance 
value is provided to low-income households. 
  Title  IV–—Job  Protection  and  Growth:  For  the  first 
decade, industry is required to purchase allowances, the 
revenue raised from qualifying energy-intensive and trade-
6. The share of offsets from international sources can increase to 50 percent if 
there are insufficient domestic offsets available. 
7. The floor and ceiling price are defined in 2009 dollars. 
exposed industries is returned to them in the form of a 
rebate to mitigate a potential loss of international competi-
tiveness resulting from higher energy prices. These rebates 
are provided in a way that rewards the cleanest and most 
efficient firms in a given industry in order to maintain the 
pollution reduction incentive created by a carbon price. 
Starting in 2026 these rebates begin to phase out. If, by 
that time, other countries have not taken action to reduce 
GHG emissions stringent enough to meet criteria laid out 
in the bill, the president is instructed to establish a program 
though which imports of energy-intensive goods into the 
US would face the same carbon price as those produced 
domestically. Title IV also includes incentives for heavy 
vehicles to switch from oil to natural gas and instructs the 
Environmental Protection Agency to establish motor vehi-
cle standards for model years after 2016 that “reflect the 
greatest emission reductions and fuel efficiency improve-
ment achievable.” While we model the natural gas incen-
tives in our core scenario, we elected to assess the impact of 
the vehicle standards instruction to EPA through an alter-
native scenario in which corporate average fuel economy 
(CAFE) standards post-2016 increase at the average annual 
rate between 2011 and 2016 (referred to as the “CAFE 
scenario” in this policy brief).
Titles V and VI address international cooperation and 
efforts to adapt to the impact of climate change and are not 
included in our analysis. Title VII addresses compliance with 
the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010 and we model the 
bill as budget neutral. A complete description of the provi-
sions of the American Power Act included in this analysis and 
the methodology used, as well as additional modeling results, 
is available online at www.rhgroup.net/americanpoweract. 
energy Sector changeS In the unIted 
StateS
By placing a price on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gas  emissions,  providing  incentives  for  low-carbon  sources 
of energy supply and improving the efficiency of energy use 
through  a  range  of  mechanisms,  the  American  Power  Act 
would  substantially  alter  the  way  energy  is  produced  and 
consumed  in  the  United  States.  By  2030,  overall  energy 
demand would be 5 percent lower than under a business-as-
usual scenario (EIA’s AEO 2009 reference case), though still 
5 percent higher than today.8 More significant is the change 
8. There are modest levels of efficiency improvement in the transportation, 
residential, commercial, and industrial sectors as a result of higher energy 
prices. In addition, we included the building codes contained in the American N u m b e r   Pb10 - 1 2   m a y   2 0 1 0
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2008 2020 2030 2020 2030
Petroleum 38.3 37.3 38.1 36.1 35.9
Natural gas 23.7 22.1 24.2 21.2 21.1
Coal 22.4 24.4 25.4 20.9 16.8
Nuclear power 8.3 9.1 9.3 10.5 14.7
Renewables 7.7 11.6 13.8 13.0 16.7
Hydropower 2.6 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.0
Biomass 2.3 3.0 3.6 4.4 4.7
Biofuels 1.5 2.6 4.0 2.5 5.0
Municipal solid  
      waste
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Wind 0.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4
Solar 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Geothermal 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0
Other 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
TOTAL 100.5 104.7 110.8 101.8 105.4
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled 
using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National 
Energy Modeling System. 
in sources of energy supply. Fossil fuels, which now meet 84 
percent of America’s energy needs, fall to 70 percent of US 
energy supply by 2030 (table 1).9 They are gradually replaced 
with nuclear and renewable energy, each of which accounts for 
8 percent of US energy consumption today and could grow to 
14 and 16 percent respectively in 2030. 
Under the American Power Act, the United States builds 
106 gigawatts of new renewable power generation capacity 
over the next two decades (figure 1). Much of this is due to 
the renewable energy incentives included in the Emergency 
Economic  Stabilization  Act  (US  House  of  Representatives 
Clean Energy Leadership Act (US Senate 2009) passed by the Senate Energy 
and Natural Resources Committee, provisions from which Senators Kerry 
and Lieberman have indicated will be married to the American Power Act on 
the Senate floor. We also assess the impact of allowance revenue earmarked 
for energy efficiency improvements on residential and commercial energy 
demand. For a complete description of provisions modeled see www.rhgroup.
net/americanpoweract/.      
9. Recent unconventional gas resource development in the United States 
has significantly changed the outlook for long-term natural gas prices and 
domestic supply. Some observers have argued that this development is not 
fully captured in the AEO 2009, which, while reflecting the current decline 
in natural gas prices, projects a rebound in gas prices in the years ahead. If the 
US gas market remains in surplus, as some analysts believe, and gas prices do 
not recover, the American Power Act could lead to greater deployment of the 
natural gas–fired power generation than our modeling suggests. We also do 
not include the “Merchant Generator Efficiency Incentives” of the American 
Power Act (Section 798) in our analysis, which could also incentivize coal to 
gas switching in the power sector. 
2008)  and  the  American  Reinvestment  and  Recovery  Act 
(US House of Representatives 2009a) but an additional 24 
gigawatts comes online as a result of the American Power Act. 
The majority of new renewable capacity is wind, accounting 
for 58 percent of the additions between 2008 and 2030 (table 
2). Biomass comes in second at 23 percent, followed by solar 
at 13 percent. By 2030, renewables account for 18 percent of 
all power generation capacity, up from 12 percent today (table 
2), and 21 percent of all electricity production, up from 10 
percent today (figure 2)10.
While renewable energy grows the fastest overall under 
the American Power Act, nuclear power sees the fastest growth 
relative to business as usual. Adding $36 billion in new loan 
guarantees and a 10 percent investment tax credit for plants 
put in operation by 2025 to a carbon price that already favors 
nuclear, the American Power Act results in 78 gigawatts of 
new nuclear power capacity over the next two decades, 68 
gigawatts more than under business as usual. By 2030, nuclear 
accounts for 15 percent power generation capacity, up from 
10 percent today (table 2). And because nuclear power has a 
higher capacity factor than most renewable sources, it accounts 
for 30 percent of all electricity generation in 2030, up from 20 
percent today (figure 2).
Low-carbon fossil fuel power generation technologies are 
also widely deployed as a result of the American Power Act. 
In addition to the carbon price, the bill includes a number 
of  incentives  for  carbon  capture  and  sequestration  (CCS). 
Qualifying CCS projects receive bonus allowances worth $96 
per ton for the first 10 gigawatts, $85 per ton for the second 
10 gigawatts and a value determined by EPA for plants after 
that. In addition, the bill imposes a small levy on electricity 
produced from fossil fuels to raise $20 billion for CCS demon-
stration projects. As a result, 72 gigawatts of CCS capacity are 
installed between 2008 and 2030, 53.7 gigawatts on coal-fired 
power plants and 18.3 gigawatts on natural gas (figure 1). And 
because natural gas emits less carbon than coal, even without 
CCS, another 40 gigawatts of natural gas generation capac-
ity is deployed by 2030. All told, by 2030 more than half 
of all electricity produced in the United States comes from 
low-carbon sources (renewable, nuclear, and CCS), up from 
today’s 29 percent (figure 2). 
While the power sector experiences the most significant 
10. The NEMS model forecasts power plant construction based on projected 
electricity demand and the relative cost of competing sources of electricity 
supply. There are considerable uncertainties surrounding cost, supply chain, 
and public acceptance of both CCS and nuclear power which account for a 
combined 47 percent of projected capacity construction under the American 
Power Act. Subsequent analysis will explore the impact of delayed or more 
expensive CCS and nuclear deployment on energy prices, employment and 
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Figure 1     New investment in power generation 
                          Million kilowatts gross capacity additions, 2010   2030
CCS = carbon capture and sequestration
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 
version of the National Energy Modeling System. 
 
changes  as  a  result  of  the  legislation  during  the  first  two 
decades, the bill includes incentives for reducing the amount 
of coal and oil consumed in the industrial, commercial, resi-
dential,  and  transportation  sectors.  By  pricing  carbon,  the 
legislation  creates  incentives  for  purchasing  more  efficient 
vehicles, producing biofuels for transportation, and switching 
from fossil fuels to cleaner and more efficient energy use in 
homes and businesses. The legislation also includes a range 
of complimentary provisions including tax credits for natu-
ral gas heavy vehicles, building codes, and industrial energy 
efficiency research and development (R&D). Taken together 
these provisions reduce household demand for heating oil by 
21 percent (compared with business-as-usual in 2030), curb 
industry coal demand by 13 percent and cut gasoline demand 
in the transportation sector by 5 percent. Under our CAFE 
scenario, gasoline demand is 14 percent lower in 2030 than 
under business as usual. Changes in transport, industry, and 
residential energy use resulting from the bill increase signifi-
cantly after 2030 once economically viable emission reduction 
opportunities in the power sector are exhausted. 
Energy Security Implications
Evaluating the impact of the American Power Act on US energy 
security is a somewhat subjective exercise as energy security is 
poorly defined in quantitative terms. Discussion in the United 
States tends to focus on American dependence on imported 
energy (though the reliability of domestic energy supply is also 
a security concern as demonstrated by the Northeast blackout 
of 2004 or Hurricane Katrina). The literature tends to group 
the security consequences of American oil dependence (which 
accounts for 84 percent of all US energy imports, the rest being 
natural  gas  from  Mexico  and  Canada)  into  four  categories 
(Crane et al. 2009 and Council on Foreign Relations 2006):
1.  The economic toll of US oil consumption, particularly at 
the high and volatile oil prices of recent years.
2.  The  foreign  policy  impact  of  US  economic  ties  to  oil 
producing states, particularly those in the Middle East.
3.  The security consequences of income transfers to oil produc-
ers, many of whom are considered “states of concern.”
4.  The international relations implications of competition for N u m b e r   Pb10 - 1 2   m a y   2 0 1 0
6






2008 2020 2030 2020 2030
Coal 315.3 333.3 344.5 313.3 331.6
with CCS 0.0 2.0 2.0 6.9 53.7
Natural Gas 428.6 421.8 511.8 406.2 435.0
with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 18.3
Oil 24.1 24.2 24.2 24.2 23.0
Nuclear power 100.6 110.3 109.8 128.4 177.4
Renewables 116.5 176.4 188.6 176.7 212.8
Hydropower 77.4 77.7 77.8 77.7 79.4
Geothermal 2.4 3.0 3.3 3.0 4.8
Municipal solid  
      waste
3.8 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.1
Biomass 6.8 12.5 20.9 11.9 28.8
Wind 24.9 66.6 68.2 67.0 80.7
Solar 1.2 12.0 13.7 12.1 14.0
Other* 25.1 27.4 27.5 27.3 27.0
TOTAL 1010.2 1093.3 1206.2 1076.1 1206.8
CCS = carbon capture and sequestration
* Other includes pump storage and end-use generation not specified in NEMS. 
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled 
using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National 
Energy Modeling System.
oil resources between the United States and other major 
economies. 
Our modeling can provide some quantitative insight into 
the  effectiveness  of  the  American  Power  Act  in  addressing 
numbers 1 and 3. Numbers 2 and 4 are primarily qualitative 
questions largely outside the scope of this paper. 
Through a combination of improved efficiency and fuel 
switching to ethanol, biodiesel, natural gas, and electricity, the 
American Power Act (under the core scenario) reduces net US 
oil imports (imports minus exports) by 33 percent below 2008 
levels and 9 percent below business as usual in 2030 (table 3). 
Lower US oil demand reduces global oil prices, the combined 
effect of which is a decrease in US expenditure on imported 
oil of $51 billion annually by 2030. NEMS models global oil 
production and US oil imports by region, but not by country 
(with the exception of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Russia). 
In tables 3 and 4 we’ve broken this down to the country level 
assuming that country’s share of the region’s oil exports to 
the US remains constant over time. National oil production 
and global trade flows two decades out are, of course, highly 
uncertain. But this approach provides a notional sense of how 
the reduction in US spending might be allocated across coun-
tries. The reduction in oil prices resulting from efficiency and 
fuel switching in the United States lowers oil producer revenue 
by $263 billion in 2030, split 50/50 between Organization 
of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC 
countries. Under our CAFE scenario net US oil imports are 
40 percent lower than 2008 levels and 19 percent lower than 
business as usual by 2030 (table 4). US spending on imported 
oil is down $93 billion per year and oil producer revenue is 
down $436 billion per year by 2030 relative to business as 
usual. 
In the coming weeks we will analyze the impact of this 
reduction in oil producer revenue on the economic and politi-
cal prospects for OPEC and non-OPEC countries alike and 
their relationship with other oil importing countries, speaking 
to numbers 3 and 4 above. For a more robust assessment of the 
effectiveness of the American Power Act in addressing number 
1,  we  will  analyze  its  impacts  during  different  oil  supply 
disruption scenarios as well as under the stable international 
oil market environment projected by the model.
Environmental Impact
The American Power Act sets out a goal of reducing US green-
house gas emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, 
42 percent by 2030, and 83 percent by 2050. In our analysis, 
the bill achieves these goals for emission sources covered by 
the legislation, roughly 85 percent of US GHG emissions, 
through 2030 (the period we assess). If emissions from non-
covered sources continue to grow on a business-as-usual trajec-
tory,  overall  US  emissions  (including  domestic  offsets  and 
sequestered carbon) will decline 8 percent below 2005 levels 
by 2020 and 17 percent by 2030. International offsets extend 
economywide emission reductions to 17 percent below 2005 
levels by 2020 and 32 percent by 2030. The American Power 
Act includes a number of provisions to reduce emissions from 
non-covered sources, including a separate trading program for 
hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) gases, which we did not evaluate 
and which would further increase overall abatement. 
It’s  also  worth  noting  that  US  CO2  emissions  have 
declined far quicker during the past two years than the AEO 
2009 projected. According to the EIA’s April 2010 Monthly 
Energy Review (EIA 2010b), US CO2 emissions in 2009 were 
5,405 million tons, 5 percent lower than the AEO 2009 busi-
ness-as-usual projections. This makes achieving the targets laid 
out in the American Power Act easier, but does not necessarily 
increase the overall level of abatement unless the recent drop 
occurred in non-covered as well as covered sources and these 
emissions remain at their new levels rather than rebounding as 
the economy comes out of recession. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 2   ma y   2 0 1 0
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Figure 2     Power generation by source
billion kwh
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Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information 
Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National Energy Modeling System. 
Note: Numbers within each column are percentages. 






Act in 2030 American Power Act vs. business-as-usual in 2030
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day






OPEC 4,903 3,429 3,100 –328 –21.6 –132.9
Saudi Arabia 1,471 992 898 –94 –6.2 –42.7
Venezuela 1,196 859 778 –81 –5.3 –9.4
Nigeria 575 373 338 –35 –2.3 –7.4
Iraq 603 407 368 –38 –2.5 –9.4
Algeria 284 258 230 –28 –1.8 –6.0
Angola 256 167 151 –16 –1.0 –6.9
Kuwait 202 136 123 –13 –0.8 –10.8
Libya 53 49 43 –5 –0.3 –5.1
Iran 0 0 0 0 0.0 –18.7
Non-OPEC 6,138 4,774 4,331 –443 –29.4 –130.3
Canada 1,758 1,486 1,350 –136 –9.1 –11.6
Mexico 1,190 773 700 –73 –4.8 –5.3
Russia 319 308 279 –29 –1.9 –22.8
Brazil 168 154 139 –15 –1.0 –9.1
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0.0 –1.2
Total  11,041 8,203 7,431 –771 –51.0 –263.1
Note:  Real 2007 US dollars using average import price for all crude oil in 2030 forecast by NEMS. Production levels in 2030 based on regional forecasts by NEMS, disaggregated 
to the country level assuming a constant 2008 share of regional production, with the exception of Canada, Mexico, Russia, and Brazil, for which country-level forecasts are 
available in NEMS.
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the AEO2009 version of the Energy Information Administration’s National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS). N u m b e r   Pb10 - 1 2   m a y   2 0 1 0
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Power Act in 
2030 American Power Act vs. business-as-usual in 2030
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day
US oil imports, 
thousand  
barrels/day






OPEC 4,903 3,429 2,749 –679 –39.8 –217.5
Saudi Arabia 1,471 992 793 –198 –11.6 –71.7
Venezuela 1,196 859 692 –167 –9.8 –14.3
Nigeria 575 373 299 –73 –4.3 –11.3
Iraq 603 407 325 –81 –4.7 –15.8
Algeria 284 258 206 –53 –3.1 –9.1
Angola 256 167 134 –33 –1.9 –10.5
Kuwait 202 136 109 –27 –1.6 –18.1
Libya 53 49 39 –10 –0.6 –7.9
Iran 0 0 0 0 0.0 –31.3
Non-OPEC 6,138 4,774 3,874 –900 –53.5 –218.9
Canada 1,758 1,486 1,204 –282 –16.7 –17.7
Mexico 1,190 773 615 –158 –9.2 –8.1
Russia 319 308 252 –56 –3.4 –34.8
Brazil 168 154 122 –31 –1.8 –13.9
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0.0 –1.8
Total 11,041 8,203 6,623 –1,579 –93.3 –436.4
Note: Real 2007 US dollars using average import price for all crude oil in 2030 forecast by NEMS. Production levels in 2030 based on regional forecasts by NEMS, disaggregated to 
the country level assuming a constant 2008 share of regional production, with the exception of Canada, Mexico, Russia and Brazil, for which country–level forecasts are available in 
NEMS.
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the AEO2009 version of the Energy Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS). 
The effectiveness of the American Power Act in meeting 
its stated emission reduction goals beyond 2030 is less clear. 
As described above, the legislation includes a price collar with 
a ceiling starting at $25 per ton and increasing at 5 percent 
per year adjusted for inflation, and a floor starting at $12 per 
ton and increasing at 3 percent per year adjusted for infla-
tion. Our analysis shows the American Power Act resulting 
in a carbon price of $16.47 in 2013 (measured in real 2009 
dollars, same as the price collar) which increases to $55.44 in 
2030. On this trajectory, the carbon price would hit the ceil-
ing sometime between 2030 and 2035. EPA has at its disposal 
an initial tranche of 4 billion allowances which are set aside in 
a strategic reserve to maintain the environmental integrity of 
the program in the event allowances prices hit the ceiling. As 
EPA sells allowances from the reserve into the market at the 
ceiling price, they are directed to replenish the reserve by using 
the revenue to purchase international offsets. The effectiveness 
of the ceiling, therefore, depends on whether international 
offset supply is sufficient and affordable enough for reserve 
replenishment given post-2030 domestic allowance demand. 
By improving energy efficiency and creating incentives 
for nonfossil sources of energy, the American Power Act would 
also significantly reduce local air pollution. By 2030, mercury 
emissions from the power sector are expected to be 43 percent 
lower than under business as usual. Nitrogen oxide emissions 
are expected to be 34 percent lower and sulfur dioxide emis-
sions 6 percent lower. 
Curbing use of fossil fuels—particularly coal—cuts air 
pollution and all its impacts on human and ecological health 
and welfare. Many of those impacts—including reduced crop 
yields and impaired ecosystem services—are not easily quanti-
fiable. They depend on wind direction and speed, temperature, 
air and soil biology, human and wildlife behaviors, and other 
factors that bear on how pollutants are dispersed and the expo-
sure and susceptibility of biological systems. For pollutants 
and damages that can be quantified, the National Research 
Council (NRC) found that the average coal-fired power plant 
produces $156 million per year or 3.2 cents per kilowatt hour N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 2   ma y   2 0 1 0
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in adverse impacts unrelated to climate change (NRC 2010). 
Older, less efficient coal and oil plants produce more of these 
pollutants than newer plants and less carbon-intensive fuels. 
The NRC panel found that 10 percent of coal-fired plants 
produce 43 percent of air pollution damages. These plants are 
the likeliest to be retired earlier under climate legislation. 
The  majority  of  monetary  damages  arise  from  human 
illness and premature mortality, particularly from respiratory 
ailments. Based on NRC calculated damages per ton of two 
criteria pollutants—sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides—the 
American Power Act would reduce damages through 2030 
from average coal plant emissions by nearly $5 billion (in 
2007 dollars). The reduction in those damages is likely to be 
higher, however, and could rise as high as $8.7 billion based 
on estimated damages from plants with higher emissions close 
to human populations. The NRC estimates do not include 
adverse impacts on human welfare or ecological health, e.g., 
reduced  visibility  from  particulates  or  reduced  crop  yields, 
fragmented  forests,  and  impaired  fisheries  from  acid  rain 
deposition. The estimates also do not include adverse impacts 
from other pollutants such as mercury (cognitive impairment 
and increased risk of heart attack), arsenic (increased risk of 
cancer), and other heavy metals. 
Also, thermoelectric plants—chiefly fossil and nuclear—
draw more water in the United States than any other purpose, 
more than four times residential, commercial, and other indus-
trial uses combined (US Geological Survey 2005). Total with-
drawals by the sector for cooling have changed little since the 
mid-1970s. By placing a price on carbon, the composition of 
generators in the electric power sector shifts toward newer, more 
efficient thermal plants—fossil, nuclear and renewable—and 
toward technologies such as wind and solar panels that require 
little or no water to operate. While some low-carbon generators 
such as solar thermal and biomass plants can use as much water 
as the fossil plants that they replace, decarbonization in general 
results in net water savings through 2030.
Based on estimated gallon per kilowatt hour consump-
tive use of water by generator types (Baum et al. 2003 and 
USDOE 2008), the American Power Act would save a total 
of 292 billion gallons by 2030 or an average of about 11.7 
billion gallons per year. This annual average savings is roughly 
1.7 times US consumption of bottled water (Pacific Institute 
2009). Peak annual water savings are five times higher and are 
sustained from 2014 through 2017.
Employment Effects
With unemployment hovering around 10 percent two and a 
half years after the recession began11 and midterm Congres-
sional elections approaching, job creation is at the top of the 
US  political  agenda  and  a  principal  frame  through  which 
politicians and the public will view the American Power Act. 
Unfortunately, existing analysis on the impact of energy and 
climate change policy on US employment is all over the map, 
forcing senators to rely primarily on anecdotal evidence and 
opinions of home state industries in forming their point of 
view on this important question. 
Attempts to quantify the employment effects of energy 
and climate change policy fall broadly into two categories. 
The first is a bottom-up approach most recently popularized 
through efforts to evaluate the jobs impact of stimulus spend-
ing as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.12 
The Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) and Center 
for American Progress (CAP), for example, argued that $100 
billion of clean energy spending would create 2 million jobs, 
four times more than the same amount spent in the oil indus-
try (Pollin et al. 2008). This analysis looked only at the gross 
employment effects, ignoring the net effect after raising taxes or 
cutting government services in future years to offset near-term 
deficit spending. But as there was broad consensus at the time 
that a good dose of Keynesian stimulus was required, spending 
money on windmills rather than ditch digging meant meeting 
economic and environmental goals simultaneously. 
The  same  analytical  approach  falls  short  when  assess-
ing the employment impacts of comprehensive energy and 
climate legislation.13 The reason is that the investment in clean 
11. The recession that began in December 2007 may have already ended but 
the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle Dating Commit-
tee has yet to date the trough. See http://www.nber.org/cycles/april2010.pdf.
12. We published an assessment of the employment impacts of various stimu-
lus provisions using NEMS in February 2009, available online at  www.piie.
com (Houser, Mohan and Heilmayr 2009). 
13. For example, a 2008 report by the US Conference of Mayors estimates the 
“By placing a price on carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gas emissions, providing 
incentives for low-carbon sources of energy 
supply and improving the efficiency of 
energy use through a range of mechanisms, 
the American Power Act would substantially 
alter the way energy is produced and 
consumed in the United States.”N u m b e r   Pb10 - 1 2   m a y   2 0 1 0
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energy and energy efficiency generated through such policy 
is paid for with higher energy prices rather than government 
borrowing. And these higher energy prices work against the 
job creation benefits of new green investment. Identifying the 
net employment impact of energy and climate legislation is a 
daunting task.
The  second  category  of  analysis  takes  a  top-down 
approach, using either top-down computable general equi-
librium  (CGE)  or  macroeconomic  models.14  These  models 
effectively capture what the bottom-up methodology used by 
PERI, the US Conference of Mayors, and others miss when 
it comes to comprehensive energy and climate policy—the 
impact of higher energy prices resulting from the switch to 
cleaner  forms  of  energy.  In  most  top-down  models,  more 
expensive energy means lower real wages because US workers 
have less money left over after paying for electricity, natural 
gas, and petroleum to buy other goods. And lower real wages 
prompt  some  workers  to  leave  the  labor  market,  reducing 
aggregate employment and further reducing consumer spend-
ing. That means lower industrial output from firms selling to 
US consumers and lower employment in those industries. In 
addition, energy-intensive industries in the United States may 
be put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their foreign competitors as 
a result of higher energy prices if other countries don’t adopt 
similar policies. This has the potential to reduce employment 
as well. 
Yet while top-down models forecast jobs lost from higher 
energy prices, they don’t accurately assess jobs created from 
the increase in investment likely to occur in the United States 
from pricing carbon (what the bottom-up models do well). 
For example, the input-output tables used in CGE model-
ing indicate the amount of investment, labor, and fossil fuels 
required by each industry to produce one dollar. These ratios 
number of “green jobs” that would be created in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency if 40 percent of power generation came from alternative sources by 
2038. Their estimate of 4.2 million “green jobs” in 2038 does not account for 
jobs lost in fossil fuel industries or due to higher energy prices.  
14. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2010) 
published a review of studies from Resources for the Future (Ho 2009), the 
Brookings Institution (McKibben et al. 2009), and Charles River Associates 
(Montgomery et al. 2009) that assess the employment impacts of energy and 
climate change policy using top-down models.  
are derived from economywide averages in whatever reference 
year is used in the model. So when policy raises energy prices 
and households and businesses improve efficiency in response, 
overall energy consumption falls and energy sector investment 
falls right along with it. This works okay for fossil fuel produc-
tion like mining coal and pumping oil, but misses most of the 
story when it comes to power generation given the state of the 
electricity sector in the United States. 
Continuing along business as usual for the United States 
means  continuing  to  operate  coal-fired  power  plants  built 
decades ago for power generation. Over 95 percent of coal-
fired generating capacity in the United States is more than 
20 years old (EIA 2007). Pricing carbon would mean replac-
ing these plants with natural gas, renewable energy, nuclear 
power,  or  retrofitting  them  for  CCS.  That  all  requires  far 
more  investment  than  maintaining  the  existing  coal-fired 
power fleet, even if overall electricity demand falls moderately 
from  efficiency  improvements.  Most  top-down  models  are 
too aggregated to capture this turnover in the capital stock. 
And given the scale of power sector transformation described 
earlier, the amount of additional investment demand created 
by the American Power Act would be significant. Now the 
economically astute reader may point out that it’s all fine and 
good to argue that pricing carbon will produce an increase in 
investment in power generation, but that investment needs to 
come from somewhere—and if the economy is at full employ-
ment a surge of investment demand will cause inflation. Both 
points are correct. But the economy is far from full employ-
ment, and in the AEO 2009, the United States doesn’t return 
to full employment until 2020. 
To  reconcile  these  two  approaches  and  capture  the 
employment impacts of both new clean energy investment 
and  higher  energy  prices  resulting  from  that  investment, 
taking account for the current economic conditions in the 
United States and state of the power generation capital stock, 
we made some enhancements to the NEMS model. NEMS is 
a hybrid model that combines a bottom-up engineering model 
of unrivaled technical detail and a top-down macroeconomic 
model that forecasts changes in GDP, consumption, invest-
ment,  trade,  industrial  output,  and  employment.15  NEMS 
provides the type of plant-level detail required to assess the 
change in power sector investment resulting from energy and 
climate  change  policy.  In  the  AEO  2009  business-as-usual 
scenario,  projected  capacity  additions  in  the  power  sector 
15. Full documentation on the NEMS model is available online at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview/. A detailed description of the assumptions 
used in assessing the American Power Act and the employment-oriented 
modifications made to NEMS is available online at www.rhgroup.net/
americanpoweract.
“Curbing use of fossil fuels—
particularly coal—cuts air pollution 
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translate into $18.6 billion per year in investment, on aver-
age, between 2011 and 2030 (in real 2007 dollars). Under the 
American Power Act, power sector investment grows to $41.1 
billion per year.16 
In the version of NEMS operated by EIA, that change 
in investment is not passed on to the macroeconomic model, 
primarily because economic and employment forecasting is 
not what EIA uses NEMS for. In the version used for this 
analysis, any increase in investment above business as usual 
was passed to the macroeconomic model, which calculated the 
net impact on US employment given the higher interest rates, 
higher  saving  rates,  increased  capital  inflows  from  abroad, 
and US dollar appreciation resulting from a shift in invest-
ment demand. Because the economy is not at full employ-
ment, because the construction of new power plants happens 
first and higher energy prices follow, this increase in invest-
ment demand modestly stimulates economic growth and job 
creation in the first decade. Between 2011 and 2020, average 
annual employment in the US increases by 203,000. In figure 
3 we break down the mix of factors shaping the labor market 
response to the legislation during this period.
  Clean energy investment: Starting on the left-hand side 
of the chart we show the number of jobs created from the 
increase in investment in new nuclear, renewable, and CCS 
power generation capacity, as well as increased production 
of biofuels, relative to business as usual. These estimates 
are derived from a detailed assessment of how $1 spent 
installing and operating each energy technology is divided 
between  industrial  sectors  (e.g.,  between  construction 
labor,  steel  production,  engineering  services,  equipment 
manufacturing,  etc.)  and  those  industries’  employment 
multipliers.17
  Reduced fossil fuel demand: From this we subtract the 
number of jobs lost through lower demand for fossil fuels 
and foregone construction of new fossil fuel power gener-
ating capacity. This includes direct, indirect, and induced 
jobs as well. 
  Higher energy prices: We further subtract the jobs lost 
when households have less money to spend on other goods 
because energy has become more expensive. 
16. Power sector investment is calculated based on the capital cost and capac-
ity addition estimates from NEMS. For more details on the methodology used 
for this analysis, see www.rhgroup.net/americanpoweract.
17. All categories include the direct (jobs created onsite at the plant), indirect 
(jobs created in companies supplying the plant with materials or services), and 
induced (jobs created when the employees spend their paychecks) employment 
effects of every dollar spent. For a complete description of the methodology 
used, see www.rhgroup.net/americanpoweract.
  Revenue  recycling:  Under  the  American  Power  Act,  a 
significant share of the emission allowances is auctioned 
and this share grows over time. The revenue from these 
auctions is used to invest in energy efficiency, transporta-
tion infrastructure, clean energy R&D and adaptation, or 
is returned to consumers to offset higher energy prices. 
The employment impact of each of these uses of allowance 
revenue is added to the running net jobs total. 
  Macroeconomic effects: The final adjustment to get to our 
203,000 net jobs number is listed in figure 3 as “macroeco-
nomic effects.” This includes changes in consumer demand 
for nonenergy goods that are more expensive because of 
higher energy costs, reduction in investment in nonenergy 
sectors because additional investment in power generation 
has pushed up interest rates, and changes in the US current 
account position resulting from a net increase in US invest-
ment demand. 
After 2020, the US economy is projected to be back at 
full employment and the additional power sector investment 
becomes more inflationary. In addition, free allocation of emis-
sion allowances to local distribution companies begin to phase 
out, which results in higher energy prices. The net effect is that 
after 2025, some of the employment gains in the first decade 
of the program are clawed back, bringing the 2011–30 average 
back in line with business as usual (average annual employ-
ment is 6,300 jobs higher than business as usual across the 
full two decade period modeled). While outside the window 
of this analysis, energy prices will likely continue to increase 
beyond 2030 as GHG abatement costs get higher. In most 
top-down analyses of the economic impacts of US energy and 
climate policy to 2050, the most significant decline from busi-
ness as usual is in the out years (see EPA 2010).
On the flip side, there are three factors that our analysis 
doesn’t cover that could improve the employment outlook of 
the American Power Act beyond 2020. These are factors that 
neither the existing top-down nor bottom-up approaches do a 
good job of capturing in a comprehensive manner.
  Market  failures:  In  general,  top-down  models  assume 
investment  automatically  flows  to  its  most  productive 
uses, i.e., that there are no imperfections in the market. 
Yet the energy sector is awash with market failures, primar-
ily in the area of energy efficiency. Last year, the World 
Business  Council  on  Sustainable  Development,  United 
Technologies  Corporation,  LaFarge  Cement,  and  12 
other corporate leaders published an exhaustive catalogue 
of  energy  efficiency  investments  in  the  buildings  sector 
that would provide an above-average rate of return but 
are  not  exploited  because  of  a  range  of  barriers,  from N u m b e r   Pb10 - 1 2   m a y   2 0 1 0
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Figure 3     Employment E￿ects of the American Power Act








































Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 
version of the National Energy Modeling System and 2008 empmloyment multipliers from IMPLAN. principal-agent problems in commercial real estate to lack 
of access to capital for residential efficiency improvements 
(WBCSD 2009). Working with this group we assessed the 
potential economic benefits of removing these barriers, and 
they are significant (Houser 2009). The American Power 
Act includes provisions, such as building codes, energy effi-
ciency retrofits, and appliance standards that are likely to 
provide rates of return greater than the economywide aver-
age that would be welfare enhancing over the long term.
  Export competitiveness: Top-down models are good at 
assessing the impact on incumbent industries from pric-
ing carbon but struggle to forecast the emergence of new 
industries in response to that carbon price. So while a loss 
of  jobs  in  energy-intensive  manufacturing  from  higher 
energy  prices  is  captured,  the  potential  increase  in  US 
competitiveness in clean energy technology abroad from 
boosting demand at home isn’t. The American Power Act 
includes significant funding for clean energy R&D to help 
increase US competitiveness. 
  Knowledge spillover: Finally, long-term economic growth 
depends largely on how fast a country develops techno-
logically. Pricing carbon will force companies to innovate, 
whether by developing technologies that deliver energy or 
changing process and production methods to use energy 
more  efficiently.  This  innovation  will  result  in  spillover 
effects that lower prices and increase production in other 
sectors. The question is whether the spillover effects from 
clean energy technology are greater than under the status 
quo. This is an important question that top-down models 
don’t address. For example, if you assessed the economic 
impact of government investment in NASA using a top-
down model, it would be welfare reducing because the 
commercial benefits of NASA-led innovation (e.g., Velcro) 
are not captured. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 2   ma y   2 0 1 0
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Table 5     Household energy prices: Core scenario
Average annual prices for liquefied  
petroleum gas (LPG), heating oil, gasoline, 
natural gas, and electricity, paid by  
households (real 2007 US dollars) 2008
Business-as-usual American Power Act Difference
2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030
LPG (dollars per gallon) $2.43 $2.52 $2.92 $2.59 $3.07 2.8% 4.9%
Heating oil (dollars per gallon) $3.32 $2.94 $3.54 $3.07 $3.80 4.6% 7.2%
Gasoline (dollars per gallon) $3.17 $3.14 $3.71 $3.25 $3.95 3.4% 6.4%
Natural gas (dollars per tcf) $13.34 $12.01 $13.46 $12.16 $13.97 1.2% 3.8%
Electricity (dollars per kilowatt hour) $0.11 $0.11 $0.11 $0.11 $0.12 2.0% 3.3%
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National Energy 
Modeling System. 
Table 6     Household energy prices: CAFE scenario
Average annual prices for liquefied  
petroleum gas (LPG), heating oil, gasoline, 
natural gas, and electricity, paid by  
households (real 2007 US dollars) 2008
Business-as-usual American Power Act Difference
2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030
LPG (dollars per gallon) $2.43 $2.52 $2.92 $2.58 $3.01 2.3% 2.9%
Heating oil (dollars per gallon) $3.32 $2.94 $3.54 $3.05 $3.69 3.9% 4.1%
Gasoline (dollars per gallon) $3.17 $3.14 $3.71 $3.24 $3.81 2.9% 2.7%
Natural gas (dollars per tcf) $13.34 $12.01 $13.46 $12.13 $13.78 1.0% 2.4%
Electricity (dollars per kilowatt hour) $0.11 $0.11 $0.11 $0.11 $0.12 1.7% 1.9%
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National Energy 
Modeling System. 
Quantifying  these  potential  long-term  economic  and 
employment  implications  of  energy  and  climate  change 
policy deserves attention from the research community and 
will  be  the  topic  of  forthcoming  joint  analysis  from  the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics and the World 
Resources Institute. 
Also,  it’s  important  to  note  that  neither  this  analysis 
nor most economic modeling of energy and climate change 
policy incorporates the avoided economic toll of a change in 
the  global  climate  from  unabated  greenhouse  gas  emission 
growth. While the costs of inaction are more difficult to quan-
tify than the costs of action, they are likely to be substantial. 
Recent estimates of the cost of projected temperature increases 
under a business-as-usual scenario range between 5 and 20 
percent of global GDP by 2100 (Cline 2009, Stern 2007, 
and Cline 1992). While US action alone will be insufficient 
to avoid these impacts, it will have a direct impact on global 
atmospheric concentrations by reducing US emissions and an 
indirect impact by increasing pressure on other countries to 
act. Evaluating the American Power Act in this context is an 
important area of additional research.
Impact on Consumers
By pricing carbon, the American Power Act raises the cost of 
fossil fuels, prompting firms and consumers to improve the 
efficiency with which they use energy or switch to low-carbon 
sources of energy supply. In our core scenario, heating oil pric-
es are on average 13 cents per gallon higher than business as 
usual between 2011 and 2020 and 25 cents per gallon higher 
between 2021 an 2030 (table 5). Gasoline is 11 and 24 cents 
per gallon more expensive during the two periods. Natural gas 
prices are 1.2 percent higher between 2011 and 2020 and 3.8 
percent higher between 2021 and 2030. Residential electricity 
prices go up by 2 percent and 3.3 percent respectively. In the 
CAFE scenario, energy price increases, particularly for trans-
portation fuels, are lower because of a decrease in demand 
(table 6). Gasoline prices are only 9 cents higher than busi-
ness as usual on average between 2011 and 2020 and 10 cents 
higher between 2021 and 2030. 
Improved efficiency mitigates the impact of higher energy 
prices on household budgets to different extents in our two 
scenarios.  In  the  core  scenario,  the  average  US  household 
spends an average of $107 more on energy each year between N u m b e r   Pb10 - 1 2   m a y   2 0 1 0
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Table 7     Household energy expenditures: Core scenario
Average annual household expenditure on 
oil, natural gas, and electricity, including for 
transportation (real 2007 US dollars) 2008
Business-as-usual American Power Act Difference
2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030
Petroleum $3,655 $3,405 $3,590 $3,498 $3,763 $93 $173
Natural gas $573 $469 $481 $468 $463 –$2 –$18
Electricity $1,311 $1,228 $1,313 $1,243 $1,322 $15 $9
Total $5,539 $5,102 $5,384 $5,209 $5,549 $107 $165
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National Energy 
Modeling System. 
Table 8     Household energy expenditures: CAFE scenario
Average annual household expenditure on 
oil, natural gas, and electricity, including for 
transportation (real 2007 US dollars) 2008
Business–as–usual American Power Act Difference
2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030 2011–2020 2021–2030
Petroleum $3,655 $3,405 $3,590 $3,469 $3,471 $65 –$119
Natural gas $573 $469 $481 $467 $459 –$2 –$22
Electricity $1,311 $1,228 $1,313 $1,241 $1,310 $13 –$3
Total $5,539 $5,102 $5,384 $5,177 $5,240 $75 –$144
Source: Authors’ estimates of the impact of the American Power Act as modeled using the Energy Information Administration’s AEO2009 version of the National Energy 
Modeling System. 
Figure 4     Average Annual Household Energy Expenditures
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2011 and 2020, $165 more between 2021 and 2030, and 
$136 more across the two decades than under business as usual 
(table 7). In the CAFE scenario, the average household spends 
$75 more per year on energy between 2011 and 2020 than 
under business as usual, but $144 less per year between 2021 
and 2030 ($35 less on average between 2011 and 2030). The 
higher CAFE standards under this scenario, however, impose 
an additional cost on households that’s not captured in this 
analysis by forcing the purchase of more expensive vehicles.
Households  will  also  face  higher  prices  for  nonenergy 
goods as the firms producing them face higher energy costs. 
This and the increase in household energy expenditures (in 
the core scenario) are offset by higher income from an increase 
in employment in the first decade and the rebate of allow-
ance revenue to consumers, which ramps up in the second 
decade. On the whole, real household consumption is slightly 
higher under the American Power Act than under business as 
usual during the period evaluated ($37 per year more on aver-
age between 2011 and 2030). Overall GDP is only moder-
ately impacted—0.07 percent higher than business as usual on 
average during the first decade and 0.23 percent lower during 
next decade. 
next StepS
In the interest of time, we have limited this analysis to a nation-
wide quantitative assessment of the impact of the American 
Power  Act  on  US  energy  security,  employment,  household 
consumption, and the environment. In the coming weeks we 
will provide recommendations on how the legislation could 
be changed to better achieve the authors’ goals in these areas. 
Also, nationwide averages gloss over important regional differ-
ences in the impact of policy to incentivize the deployment of 
clean energy technology and reduce GHG emissions. We are 
currently analyzing the impact of the American Power Act at 
a state level and will publish our findings in the weeks ahead. 
This analysis will break down impacts by industry and house-
hold income level. Finally, forthcoming work will assess the 
effectiveness of the American Power Act in buffering the US 
from oil supply shocks either domestically or in other parts of 
the world. 
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